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Our conclusions are that the most important influences on unemployment
come from the following.
(i) The longer unemployment benefits are available the longer unemployment
lasts.  Similarly, higher levels of benefits generate higher unemployment, with
an elasticity of around one half.  On the other hand active help in finding
work can reduce unemployment.  So more “flexibility” may need to be
complemented by more intervention to provide active help.
(ii) Union coverage and union power raise unemployment.  But if wage
bargaining is decentralised, wage bargainers have incentives to settle for
more than the “going rate”, and only higher unemployment can prevent them
leap-frogging.  Although decentralisation makes it easier to vary relative
wages, this advantage is more than offset by the extra upward pressure on the
general level of wages.  Thus, where union coverage is high, coordinated
wage bargaining leads to lower unemployment.
(iii) Conscious intervention to raise the skill levels of less able workers is an
important component of any policy to combat unemployment.  Pure wage
flexibility may not be sufficient because it leads to growing inequality which
in turn discourages labour supply from less able workers.
Thus in these areas it is clear what types of reform are needed.  If well
designed, such reforms might halve the level of unemployment in many countries.
But there are three other remedies which have been widely advocated in both
the OECD Jobs Study and the Delors White Paper.  These are: less employment
protection, lower taxes on employment, and lower working hours.  Our research
does not suggest that lower employment taxes or lower hours would have any long
term effects; while the effects of lower employment protection would be small.
(iv) Lower employment protection has two effects.  It increases hiring and thus
reduces long-term unemployment.  But it also increases firing and thus
increases short-term unemployment.  The first (good) effect is almost offset
by the second (bad) one.  The gains from flexibility are small.
(v) Employment taxes do not appear to have any long-term effect on
unemployment  and are borne entirely by labour.  There may be some short-
term effects, but it is not clear that there would be any fall in inflationary
pressure if taxes on polluting products were raised at the same time as taxes
on employment were lowered.
(vi) Hours of work appear to have no long-term effect upon unemployment.
Equally, if early retirement is used in order to reduce labour supply, it is
necessary to reduce employment pari passu unless inflationary pressure is to
increase.  While flexible hours and participation can reduce the fluctuations
in unemployment over the cycle, they cannot affect its average level.
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1COMBATTING UNEMPLOYMENT:
IS FLEXIBILITY ENOUGH?
R. Jackman, R. Layard, S. Nickell1
What is the route to lower unemployment?  Is it through greater
labour market flexibility, involving deregulation and decentralisation?
Or are there areas where more collective action, rather than less, is
required?
To examine this issue we have tried to see how differences of
policy and institutions affect the unemployment levels in the different
OECD countries.  (We are concerned not with cyclical fluctuations but
with the average levels of unemployment over a run of years.)  The
factors whose possible influence we examine are:
(i) how unemployed people are treated (benefit levels and
active help with job-finding);
(ii) how wages are determined;
(iii) how skills are formed;
(iv) how far jobs are protected by redundancy legislation;
(v) how heavily employment is taxed, and
(vi) how far labour supply is reduced through reductions in
hours of work and through early retirement.
Our conclusions are that the most important influences on
unemployment come from the following.
(i) The longer unemployment benefits are available the longer
unemployment lasts.  Similarly, higher levels of benefits
generate higher unemployment, with an elasticity of around
one half.  On the other hand active help in finding work can
reduce unemployment.  So more “flexibility” may need to
be complemented by more intervention to provide active
help.
(ii) Union coverage and union power raise unemployment.  But
if wage bargaining is decentralised, wage bargainers have
2incentives to settle for more than the “going rate”, and only
higher unemployment can prevent them leap-frogging.
Although decentralisation makes it easier to vary relative
wages, this advantage is more than offset by the extra
upward pressure on the general level of wages.  Thus, where
union coverage is high, coordinated wage bargaining leads
to lower unemployment.
(iii) Conscious intervention to raise the skill levels of less able
workers is an important component of any policy to combat
unemployment.  Pure wage flexibility may not be sufficient
because it leads to growing inequality which in turn
discourages labour supply from less able workers.
Thus in these areas it is clear what types of reform are needed.  If
well designed, such reforms might halve the level of unemployment in
many countries.
But there are other remedies which have been widely advocated
(some of them in the OECD Jobs Study and/or the Delors White
Paper).  These include: less employment protection, lower taxes on
employment, and lower working hours.  Our research does not suggest
that lower employment taxes or lower hours would have any long term
effects; while the effects of lower employment protection would be
small.
(iv) Lower employment protection has two effects.  It increases
hiring and thus reduces long-term unemployment.  But it
also increases firing and thus increases short-term
unemployment.  The first (good) effect is almost offset by
the second (bad) one.  The gains from flexibility are small.
(v) Employment taxes do not appear to have any long-term
effect on unemployment  and are borne entirely by labour.
There may be some short-term effects, but it is not clear that
there would be any fall in inflationary pressure if taxes on
polluting products were raised at the same time as taxes on
employment were lowered.
3(vi) Hours of work appear to have no long-term effect upon
unemployment.  Equally, if early retirement is used in order
to reduce labour supply, it is necessary to reduce
employment pari passu unless inflationary pressure is to
increase.  While flexible hours and participation can reduce
the fluctuations in unemployment over the cycle, they
cannot affect its average level.
We can now proceed to the evidence for these assertions.  We
begin by looking at the pattern of unemployment differences between
countries and estimate an equation which explains it, using all the
factors we find significant.  We then discuss each factor in turn,
drawing on other evidence where relevant.  We end with policy
conclusions.
1.   COUNTRY DIFFERENCES
There are wide differences in unemployment rates across
countries, but one feature of these differences has been little noticed:
a large part of the variation is in long-term unemployment.  This is
shown in Table 1.  It appears that countries can live with very different
rates of long-term unemployment, whereas some short-term
unemployment seems inevitable.  The reason for this “optional” nature
of long-term unemployment appears to be that long-term
unemployment has a much lower effect on wage pressure than does
short-term unemployment (OECD 1993, p.94).  
To explain unemployment it is therefore useful to explain
separately not only the total of unemployment but also its two different
parts (short-term and long-term).  We shall explain unemployment
rates in 1983-8 and 1989-94, using the following main explanatory
variables:
Replacement rate (%)
Benefit duration (years; indefinite=4 years)
4Active labour market policy per unemployed person as %
of output per worker (ALMP)
Union coverage (1 under 25%, 2 middle, 3 over 75%)
Coordination in wage bargaining (1 low, 2 middle, 3 high)
Employment protection (ranking: 1 low, 20 high)
Change in inflation (percentage points per annum).
The last variable is included because it is always possible to achieve a
temporary fall in unemployment through allowing inflation to
increase.2  The values of the variables are in Table 2.  
The explanatory regression was a pooled regression for the two
sub-periods.  (We checked that the two sets of coefficients in the two
sub-periods were not as a set significantly different.)  The results are in
Table 3.  In the equation for long-term unemployment we also include
short-term unemployment as a regressor.
OECD countries do of course display quite severe persistence in
unemployment, and our two six-year periods may not be long enough
to eliminate these effects.3  However, terms measuring lagged
unemployment were either insignificant or incorrectly signed, and have
therefore not been included.  The pooled regression was however
estimated by the random-effects method which to some extent
discounts the effects of persistent country specific factors.
Turning to our results, we can first explain the cross-country
variation of long-term unemployment.  All the variables reflecting the
treatment of unemployed people come in with the predicted sign.  The
system of wage bargaining is also important.  Employment  protection
raises long-term unemployment.
However when we turn to short-term unemployment, things
change.  Not surprisingly, benefit duration and active labour market
policy (ALMP) are unimportant.  And, as expected, employment
protection reduces short-term unemployment, by reducing the inflow
to unemployment.
Turning to the effects on total unemployment, employment
protection has an insignificant effect.  But unemployment does respond
5logW'&?log(cu)%Z%log(Y/L) (1)
logW'ß%log(Y/L) (2)
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to how unemployed people are treated and to how wages are
determined.
To understand why all these variables might affect
unemployment, we need to see how they fit into an integrated
framework.  This is provided by the system of wage and price
equations.  Assuming no price surprises, we have
Wage equation
Price equation (simplified)
where W is the real cost per worker, u the unemployment rate, c the
“effectiveness” of the unemployed, Z the impact of other wage pressure
variables, and Y/L is output per head of labour force.
Thus the equilibrium unemployment rate is given by
The key variables affecting unemployment are those which affect “wage
pressure” (namely c and the Zs) plus the effect of unemployment in
offsetting wage pressure (?).  We can now examine each of the possible
causes of unemployment for their effect on wage pressure.
2.  POLICIES TO THE UNEMPLOYED
Benefits
6Benefits work through two mechanisms.  First, they reduce the
fear of unemployment and thus directly increase wage pressure from
the unions (a simple Z factor).  But second, and more important, they
reduce the ‘effectiveness’ of unemployed people (c) as fillers of
vacancies.  This encourages employers to raise wages.  It also reduces
the competition which newly unemployed workers will face in their
search for jobs, which again encourages the unions to push for higher
wages.
Since any reduction in effectiveness (c) leads to an
equiproportional increase in unemployment, one can obtain an estimate
of the effects of benefits (working through c) from micro cross-sectional
studies which explain exit rates by benefits, holding vacancies constant.
These estimates typically give an elasticity of exit rates with respect to
the replacement ratio of around one half, with a wide range on either
side (Narendranathan et al., 1985; Atkinson and Micklewright 1991).
A second key dimension of unemployment benefits is their
potential duration.  Long-term benefits increase long-term
unemployment.  There are two processes at work here.  First benefits
reduce exit rates in general.  But the resulting long-term unemployment
further reduces exit rates.  For in those countries where long-term
unemployment is common, the exit rates for the long-term unemployed
are much lower than for the short-term unemployed - in other words
they have lower c.  At least in part this appears to reflect a state-
dependence of exit rates on duration (Jackman and Layard, 1991).
Thus the incidence of long-term unemployment shifts out the U/V
curve in many European countries (Budd, Levine and Smith, 1988).
However when unemployment benefits run out quite quickly exit
rates decline much less as duration lengthens .  This is confirmed by
Meyer and Katz (1991) and Carling et al., (1995) for the US and
Sweden, where benefits run out after 6 and 14 months respectively.  By
contrast in Britain and Australia, where benefits are long-lived, there
is much more state dependence.  (Jackman and Layard, 1991; Fahrer
and Pease, 1993.)
7Active labour market policies (ALMP)
If long-duration benefits have negative effects, one approach is
simply to provide no help to unemployed people beyond some period.
Given sufficient wage flexibility, this will increase employment.  But
the cost will be more unequal wages, and not all of long-term
unemployment will be eliminated.  
An alternative is to provide some help to all who do not get
benefit, but to give it through activity rather than though benefits.  This
cuts off the flow of long-term unemployment at least for the period for
which the active measures last, and gives all the unemployed at least a
chance to prove themselves.
This latter alternative is the Swedish model:  active labour market
policy replaces benefits.  It should be sharply distinguished from other
systems of active labour market policy where the uptake of the help
offered is voluntary, so that labour market activity is an optional
alternative to benefits.  While active labour market policies of the
second kind do continue in many countries, there is an interesting shift
towards the Swedish model in Switzerland, while Denmark which has
always had a similar general approach to Sweden’s has now shortened
the “passive” period of benefit duration to 2 years (Schwanse, 1995).
In our regression equation, we find that dropping Sweden eliminates
the effect of active labour market policy spending on long-term
unemployment, consistent with the view that only Swedish-style
ALMPs make a real difference.
The case for active labour market policy comes of course from
social cost-benefit analysis.  But it is also important to note that in
terms of costs and benefits to the Ministry of Finance, optional ALMP
is quite costly per unit reduction in unemployment, since those helped
by the subsidy will include a disproportionate number of people who
would have exited anyway (the problem of ‘deadweight’).
Replacement ALMP can more nearly break-even, since all of those still
unemployed are helped; there is thus a known maximum for the
proportion of those helped who would have exited otherwise (the
problem of “deadweight” is reduced, through avoiding creaming).
8The other problem with active labour market policy is
“substitution and displacement” - if an employer employs someone
who would not have exited otherwise, this may disemploy someone
else who would otherwise have been employed.  In normal discussions
this problem is greatly exaggerated.  For the aim of ALMP is to help
people who would otherwise have had low exit probabilities.  By
positive discrimination in their favour, vacancies go to them rather than
to others who had better exit probabilities (were more employable).
The effect is to increase the total stock of employable workers who are
still unemployed.  So vacancies get filled faster and employment
expands.  By helping the hard to place, the total stock of employable
labour expands.  In response the total stock of jobs expands.
We can easily see this in the context of our model - equations (1)
and (2).  There is a certain required level of cu.  Through the active
labour market policy the average effectiveness of the unemployed (c)
is increased.  This decreases wage pressure at each level of
unemployment (see Figure 1).  In consequence there is an increase in
the equilibrium employment rate.  Assuming that when prices are set
the mark-up of prices over wages is constant, as in Figure 1,
unemployment falls by the same proportion that average effectiveness
(c) rises.
But what about substitution and displacement?  If for example
action is taken to help the long-term unemployed, does this increase
short-term unemployment?  The logic of our model says No.
Suppose the short-term unemployed have effectiveness cs and the
long-term unemployed have effectiveness cL.  Equilibrium requires a
given level of (csus+cLuL) in order to restrain wage pressure.  We now
through   ALMP   improve   cL,   while  cs  remains  unchanged.   What
happens?  uL falls and us remains unchanged.  Why?
The stock of short-term unemployed depends on the total inflow
into unemployment (S) and on the exit rate from short-term
unemployment.  This latter is equal to cs times the exit rate for a person
with effectiveness equal to unity, i.e., it equals csS/cu L, where L is
labour force.  But cu is given.  Thus if S/L and cs remain unchanged, so
9does the exit rate from short-term unemployment and so does the stock
of short-term unemployed.
The short-term unemployed get the same number of jobs per
period because the long-term unemployed also get the same number of
jobs per period.  The only thing that has changed is that the stock of
long-term unemployed has fallen since the exit rate from long-term
unemployment has risen.  Thus the long-term unemployed do not take
jobs from the short-term unemployed.  
There is no job-fund.  Employment expands as the effective
supply of labour expands.  This should be obvious to anyone who
contemplates the employment miracle which occurred when the
Pilgrim Fathers landed at Cape Cod and found a sudden increase in the
demand for labour on  those inhospitable shores.  But, as expressed so
far, it is a medium term argument.  In the short-run there may be some
constraints on the demand side.  For example, if nominal demand is
fixed, an increase in the effective supply of labour will generate some
new jobs, due to lower inflation, but the increase in jobs will be less
than the increase in labour supply.  If, however, the government has an
inflation target, then even in the short-run employment will increase in
line with the effective supply of labour.
This result provides important insights but may need modifying
to suit the details of particular schemes.  In any case it says nothing
about the effectiveness of particular schemes.  This depends on how
well they do indeed improve the effectiveness of the individuals who
are exposed to them.
Clearly schemes are more effective when they are not optional
(see above) but then they are also more difficult to study - since there
is no control group.  Thus most studies of ALMP relate to optional
schemes and compare people who were and were not exposed to such
schemes. The micro-economic studies have been well summarised in
OECD (1993) and Fay (1995).  The general findings are (i) a good
return to assistance with job-finding, (ii) a goodish return to subsidised
self-employment, (iii) some return to targeted recruitment subsidies,
(iv) a weaker return to public sector job creation and (v) an often weak
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return to the training of unemployed people.  In most cases heavy
deadweight is the main factor reducing the return.
Our conclusion is that major expansions of ALMP can only be
justified where the aim is to achieve universal coverage of some group
(e.g., the long-term unemployed).  This will greatly reduce deadweight,
since in any disadvantaged group the overall outflow rates are generally
low.  It is also the only way to make any large dent in unemployment.
Going further, what is needed is in fact a change of regime.  When
people enter unemployment they need to understand that there will be
no possibility of indefinite life on benefits.  Instead it should be made
clear that, after a period of say one year, public support will be
provided only through participation on a programme.  But access to the
programme is guaranteed.  This will have the twin effect of (a) helping
those who really need help and (b) driving off the public purse those
who only want help in the form of cash.
This is the Swedish model, which played a central role in holding
down Swedish unemployment to around 2% until the end of the
1980s.4  The model has of course come under heavy pressure recently
due to bad macroeconomic management: over-expansionary policy in
the late 1980s followed by over-contraction.  The Swedes have been
right to continue with ALMP, since institutional/cultural arrangements
of this kind cannot easily be re-established once they have been
abandoned (Layard, 1995).  But the experience makes it clear that
ALMP is not primarily a counter-cyclical device - it needs to be a
permanent feature of the economic and social system.5
3.  WAGE BARGAINING
The next key factor affecting equilibrium unemployment is the
system of wage determination.  In systems where wages are settled in
a decentralised way (either by employers’ fiat or by bargaining) there
is always a problem of leapfrogging.  Even in the absence of bargaining,
some employers may have an incentive to pay an “efficiency” wage
11
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above the supply price of labour, in order to motivate and retain staff.
Indeed, unless unemployment is high enough, they will generally try to
pay more than the going wage paid by other employers.  Unions will
also seek to raise their pay above that of other unions.  
This problem of leapfrogging can be reduced when wages are
centrally coordinated (namely by centralised positions adopted by the
unions and the employers).  A simple illustration will suffice, where
unions can freely choose their pay so as to maximise the expected
income of their members.  If the choice is decentralised, the union
chooses   the   firm-level   wage   (Wi)   to  maximise   a  function  like
(Wi-A)Ni  where  Ni  is  firm-level  employment,  and  A  is expected
income outside the firm.   A is then given by  (1-u)We+uB,  where  We
is the expected outside wage and B benefits.  (The price level is taken
as exogenous.)  This leads to a wage given by
So, for equilibrium (Wi equal to We), unemployment is given by
By contrast a centralised union would be setting the wage for
everybody and would choose it to maximise NW, recognising that
workers disemployed by the wage settlement would have no alternative
income opportunity (so that A=0), unemployment benefits simply
being a transfer from employed to unemployed union members.  Unless
an increase in employment required a more than proportionate fall in
the real wage, the union would choose a wage consistent with full
employment.  A similar result can be obtained in a wage bargaining
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model.  If by contrast employers set efficiency wages, there are also
advantages from coordination to reduce leap-frogging, though
employers would collectively choose non-zero unemployment as a
worker-discipline device.
All this is on the assumption of homogenous labour.  If labour is
heterogenous, the arguments for decentralisation become more
powerful.  Under coordinated bargaining it is quite difficult to achieve
the shifts in relative wages that may be required in response to
differential shifts of relative demands and supplies.  Thus coordinated
bargaining reduces unemployment by cutting out leapfrogging, but
increases it by worsening structural imbalances.  The overall outcome
is an empirical issue.
The issue appears to be quite clearly resolved in Table 2.
Coordination has a powerful influence in reducing unemployment.  An
uncoordinated economy will have, other things equal, an
unemployment rate more than twice as high as an economy with highly
coordinated wage-setting arrangements.  Our results suggest, however,
that a fully co-ordinated economy with a high degree of union coverage
will have approximately the same unemployment rate as an economy
with low union coverage and no coordination.
In this context we should perhaps refer to the view of Calmfors
and Driffill (1988) that, while full centralisation has advantages,
coordination at the industry level gives the worst of all worlds (due to
the low demand elasticity for labour in one industry).  The implication
is that if full centralisation is too difficult, one should go for full
decentralisation.  We believe this argument is misleading.  On the
empirical level the finding is not robust (Soskice, 1990).  Moreover it
ignores the obvious point that, when comparing countries, it is not only
the degree of centralisation which rises but the degree of union
coverage.  The USA does not have decentralised bargaining; it has
hardly any unions.  Other things equal, higher coverage is bad for
employment but this effect can be offset by sufficient coordination.
This is precisely what our equation shows.
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With regard to the impact of relative wage flexibility, we tried
introducing the degree of wage dispersion as a further independent
variable in the Table 3 regressions.  It turned out insignificant in
relation to total unemployment (t=0.6) and long-term unemployment
(t=-0.9), but to have a significant positive effect (t=4.2) in increasing
short-term unemployment.  These results suggest the complexity of the
issues surrounding wage flexibility.
The truth is that coordination is a very subtle affair.6  But the
more there is, it appears, the better.  Equally the task of achieving it
appears to have become more difficult, possibly reflecting the greater
exposure to international competition in both product and factor
markets in recent years.
4.  SKILLS  IMBALANCE7
One possible reason why unemployment is higher than in the
1970s is the steady fall in the demand for unskilled workers.  If this is
not matched by an equal fall in supply, this can certainly cause an
increase in unemployment.  
To see this we can (for simplicity) divide the labour force into two
categories, skilled and unskilled denoted 1 and 2 respectively.  We
shall assume that output is produced by a Cobb-Douglas production
function
Thus the demand for labour of type i is given by8
where W is the cost per worker, L total labour force and li = L i/L.  It
follows that, if the unemployment rate of a group is to remain constant
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when a i rises or falls, wages must adjust in line.  Equally, when the
labour force composition changes, wages must also adjust.
The problem is that wages do not normally adjust as they
‘should’.  Usually it takes extra unemployment to get wages down.
There is much evidence to support the following wage equation
where zi measures a return of wage pressure effects.  From (1) and (2)
we can see that the unemployment of a group is determined by
If the relative demand for a group (a i) falls faster than the relative
supply of people in that group (li),   then (log l i-log a i) falls,  and the
unemployment rate in that group rises.  There is thus a ceaseless race
between shifts in demand and shifts in supply.
The change in unemployment of group i is
where f i =ui /(ui +?).  We can interpret this in terms of Figure 2.  The
demand for type i labour (relative to its supply) shifts to the left by the
same amount if the labour supply (li) increases by 1% or the labour
demand (a i ) falls by 1%.  Both of the shifts in supply and demand
have the same effect.  The effect on unemployment is greater the more
rigid are wages.  The lower is ? the more rigid are wages and the greater
the rise in unemployment.  Moreover the absolute rise in
unemployment is greater the higher the existing level of unemployment
(ui) - due to the curved nature of the wage function.
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In modern societies a race is in progress between the increase in
the demand for skilled labour (measured by a 1) and the supply of
skilled labour (measured by l1).  If the supply of skill fails to increase
as fast as the demand, total unemployment will rise.  To see this, note
that the total change in unemployment is
where ?i=f i li /a i.
The first of these terms is a pure composition effect - if the labour
force becomes more concentrated in low-unemployment groups,
unemployment will tend to fall.  The second term reflects the problems
which stem from wage rigidity.  Since log wages depend on log
unemployment, one extra point of unemployment reduces wages less
for a group whose unemployment is high.  Thus switching labour into
the skilled group reduces overall unemployment - the downwards force
on skilled wages outweighs the upwards force on unskilled wages (f 2-
f 1 >0).  The third term shows the effect of technical progress raising
the relative demand for skilled labour.  Since l2 /a2 >1 and 11/a1<1, a
rise in the demand for skilled labour (a1) raises overall unemployment,
by raising the demand for labour where the wage pressure responds
sharply to extra demand and reducing demand where wages are
unresponsive to demand.
Empirical work
Empirical work using this kind of approach is still at a preliminary
stage.  However Nickell and Bell (1995a and b) give results using a
similar model, with a more general CES production function.  They
tentatively estimated that on average one fifth of the rise in
unemployment from the late 70s to the late 80s in Germany, Holland,
Spain, UK and Canada was due to structural shifts of demand relative
to supply.  Nickell (1995b) gives similar results.
16
logW'&?1u&?11? u%zw (7)
5.  EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION
It is widely believed that labour market flexibility is good for the
macroeconomy and that employment protection legislation is an
impediment to such flexibility.  So it is argued that freedom of action
for employers to dismiss workers on economic grounds is necessary for
a smoothly functioning economy, though it is of course desirable to
protect employees from arbitrary, unfair or discriminating dismissals.
However, it may be tricky in practice to protect employees from
arbitrary dismissal while simultaneously allowing freedom of action for
employers to dismiss on economic grounds.  Thus it may be felt
necessary by benevolent legislators to circumscribe this freedom of
action.9  The macroeconomic consequences of this are, however, of
major importance - both on the process of short-run adjustment and on
the long-run equilibrium level of unemployment.
Theoretical background
Employment protection has a potential impact at a number of
different points in the operation of the labour market.  It obviously
impedes employment adjustment by reducing both flows from
employment, because of the legal hurdles, and flows into employment
by making employers more cautious about hiring.  It may also influence
wage determination, for example by raising the power of insiders or by
lengthening unemployment duration.  Finally, because of the excessive
caution of employers, it may impede the absorption of new entrants
into the labour market thereby reducing participation rates and raising
relative youth unemployment rates.
Consider the following model, where we ignore nominal inertia
(wage/price stickiness), labour force growth and trend productivity
effects.  Wage setting is given by
17
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where zw are wage pressure shocks.  The demand for labour is given by
n=log employment, zn=labour demand shifts (e.g., productivity shocks)
and  ß1  is the long-run labour demand elasticity.   If  we suppose  the
labour force to be fixed and normalised to unity, (8) can be written as
Then, eliminating real wages from (7) and (9), we obtain
where u* is the equilibrium unemployment rate, given by
and the speed of adjustment, 1-a11, is given by
From this analysis, we see that there are two important questions.
First, how might employment protection influence the speed of
adjustment, 1-a11?  Second, how might employment protection affect
the equilibrium unemployment rate, u*?  The first of these is
18
straightforward.  We would expect employment protection to raise
employment adjustment costs and this would increase ?.  Furthermore,
employment protection may tend to increase long-term unemployment
by reducing the rate of flow from unemployment to employment, as
employers become more cautious about hiring.  This will typically
generate hysteresis effects in wage determination and thereby raise ?11.
Increases in both ? and ?11 will tend to reduce the overall speed of
adjustment, 1-a11.
Turning to the second question, namely the impact on equilibrium
unemployment, it is important to recognise that, just because
employment protection may tend to lengthen the duration of
unemployment spells, this does not mean that it will necessarily raise
equilibrium unemployment, u*.  For offsetting the duration effect is the
reduction in flows.  The flow into unemployment is obviously reduced
by regulations designed to restrict dismissals.  Since the unemployment
rate is the product of the inflow rate and the mean duration, the overall
effect of employment protection on u* is indeterminate.  
Looking at the formula for u* in (11), there are a number of
possibilities.  First, employment protection may influence wage
pressure, zw, directly, for example, by raising the power of insiders.
Second, employment protection can raise the impact of unemployment
on wages, ?1, by making the threat of unemployment more unpleasant
(longer duration, harder to find alternative employment).  On the other
hand, of course, since employees are protected against dismissal to
some extent, the threat of unemployment is less germane and this will
reduce ?1.  So the overall effect on u* is ambiguous.
Finally, we have not modelled participation in this exercise but
we should consider the implications of employment protection for
employment rates as well as unemployment rates when we come to our
empirical investigation.
Evidence on unemployment dynamics
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Our purpose in this section is to explore the evidence on the
relationship between employment protection, employment adjustment
and both the dynamics of labour demand (?) and the extent of
hysteresis in wage determination (?11).10
We first investigate the relationship between some empirical
measures of ?, a measure of the rate of turnover of employees within
companies (the percentage of employees with job tenures less than 2
years, PL2) and the OECD composite ranking of the tightness of
employment protection (EP).  The data are reported in Table 4.  The
first point to note is the very strong correlation between EP and PL2,
the correlation coefficient between the two variables being 0.9.  So the
variation in the rate of turnover (as captured by the proportion of
employees with less than two years tenure) is explained almost entirely
by the strictness of the employment protection laws.  The relationship
between PL2 and our various measures of ? is set out in Table 5.  In
two out of the three cases, we see that PL2 is significantly related to the
aggregate measure of labour demand sluggishness (?).  Overall,
therefore, there is some evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the
speed of adjustment in labour demand is negatively related to the
strictness of employment protection legislation.
Turning next to wage determination, we are concerned here with
the relationship between the degrees of hysteresis (?11) and
employment protection, operating via long-term unemployment.  The
impact of long-term unemployment on the extent of hysteresis is
confirmed explicitly in Layard et al. (1991), Chapter 9, Table 9 and
implicitly in OECD (1993, Chapter 3).11 So we can simply focus on the
impact of employment protection on long-term unemployment, in
particular on the proportion of the unemployed who have a duration
of more than one year.  As well as employment protection, we should
also expect the long-term proportion to be influenced by the duration
of benefit availability (BD) and by expenditure on active labour market
policies (ALMP), many of which are designed to prevent the build-up
of long-term unemployment.  In Table 4 we provide two measures of
long-term unemployment.  The first is simply the 1985-93 average
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proportion of unemployed with durations exceeding one year.  The
second attempts to standardise this proportion, when possible, by
measuring it for each country when unemployment lies between 5 and
7%.  The idea here is to focus on the extent of long-term
unemployment at given levels of aggregate unemployment.  Because
the long-term proportion tends to be an increasing function of the
overall unemployment rate in the long-run, anything which explains
unemployment in general will tend to be correlated with the long-term
proportion in a cross-section.  The standardised measure will eliminate
this problem.
The relevant regressions explaining the two measures of the long-
term proportion are:
LTU (standardised) =21.5+0.24BD-0.51ALMP87+0.55EP+13.8IT
                                             (2.7)      (3.2)                (1.5)         (2.8)
N=19, R2=0.55
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LTU 85-93 =37.4+0.55BD-0.33ALMP91+1.77EP+30.6IT
                                             (3.4)      (3.9)                (3.3)         (3.6)
N=17, R2=0.82
(IT is a dummy for Italy, which is included because although Italy has
only a short benefit duration, the level of benefit is negligible so its
duration is irrelevant.)  The overall picture is that there is some
evidence that stricter employment protection legislation raises long-
term unemployment and thus enhances hysteresis in wage-setting.
When added to the results on labour demand, we feel that we have
some fairly strong and coherent evidence that the strictness of
employment protection legislation does influence labour market
dynamics by raising unemployment persistence.  Whether or not it
influences the equilibrium level of unemployment is the issue we
consider next.
Evidence on equilibrium unemployment
As we noted earlier, employment protection can influence
equilibrium unemployment by directly influencing wage pressure
and/or by affecting the impact of unemployment on wages (?1).  This
latter parameter is crucial in translating wage pressure into
unemployment (see equation 11).
We begin by looking at the effect of employment protection on
?1 and then move onto consider its overall impact on average
unemployment.  As we argue in Layard et al. (1991), there are a
number of other possible factors which can influence ?1.  These include
the structure of the benefit system (replacement rates and benefit
duration), and the extent of union and employer coordination in wage
bargaining.  In Table 4, we present estimates of ?1 from Layard et al.
(Chapter 9, Table 7).  The relevant regression to explain ?1 is
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?1=11.9-0.078RR-2.12BD+1.32(UNCD+EMCD)+0.23EP
             (0.9)       (4.8)       (2.3)                             (1.7)
N=19, R2=0.71
This indicates that if employment protection legislation is very strict,
this tends to be associated with high values of ?1.  Of course, EP is not
significant at conventional levels but it is most unlikely that there is, in
reality, a strong effect in the opposite direction.  So, from this channel
the data indicate, if anything, employment protection reduces
unemployment.  But, since we know that employment protection can
also increase wage pressure, we must also investigate its total impact on
unemployment. 
This was done in Table 3.  As this showed, there is some weak
evidence that employment protection tends overall to increase
employment.  But the t-statistics are never very significant.  We ran a
large number of further variations using alternative measures of union
density and union coverage and also different measures of employment
protection.  In some eighteen regressions, we were able to obtain only
two significant negative coefficients on EP.  So there is no strong
evidence that employment protection affects equilibrium
unemployment.  This is, of course, consistent with the fact that while
we have good reason to expect employment protection legislation to
reduce flows both into and out of unemployment, we have no strong
reasons for believing either effect to dominate.
Conclusions
We would expect employment protection legislation to slow
down the speed with which the labour market adjusts to shocks but to
have only a minor impact on the long-run equilibrium.  It may however
affect the position of those entering or re-entering the labour market
because of the effective restrictions on hiring.  In practice, there is
considerable evidence that employment protection reduces adjustment
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speeds in the labour market.  But it is hard to find any significant
effects on equilibrium unemployment rates.
6.   TAXES ON EMPLOYMENT
Lowering payroll taxes is a perennial suggestion by those
concerned to reduce unemployment.  Thus the OECD Jobs Study
(1994) recommends that we should “Reduce non-wage labour costs,
especially in Europe, by reducing taxes on labour....” (p.46).  The
European Commission’s White Paper on Employment proposes a
reduction in payroll taxes in conjunction with an increase in taxes on
energy.  Another straightforward policy would be to lower payroll
taxes and make up the shortfall by raising consumption taxes.  Phelps
(1994) argues that “such a substitution of tax instruments would
achieve a major gain in employment and some gain in the general level
of real wage rates as well” (p.28).  Presumably, such a switch would
work equally as well in a non-European country, such as the United
States, where the sum of payroll and income taxes is substantial.
The general argument for this switch goes as follows.12  Payroll
taxes apply only to labour income; consumption taxes apply to all
income (which is spent).  So a switch from the former to the latter
raises the reward for working relative to not working and thereby
reduces unemployment.  More formally, we may write total real
income in work net of taxes, Y, as
where W=labour costs, t1=payroll tax rate, t 2=income tax rate,
P=output
price at factor cost,   t3=consumption tax rate,  Yn=non-labour income.
This may be rewritten as
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where  ?=(1-t1)(1-t2)/(1+t3)(1-t1-t2-t3),  the tax wedge,  yn=Yn/W,
the ratio of non-labour income to labour costs.  Consider now the real
income when unemployed, Yu.  This may be written as
where b=B/W(1-t1)=unemployment benefit/wage ratio.  The definition
of Yu assumes that benefits are subject to income tax.
In most theories of wage determination, the wage cost which is set
depends on Y/Yu which is increasing in b, yn and t1.  Increases in b, yn
and t1 will, therefore, automatically raise equilibrium unemployment.
So a reduction in t1 and an equal increase in  t3 will leave the tax
wedge, ?, unchanged but will lower equilibrium unemployment so long
as yn is not zero.13  How big is this effect?  The crucial factor is the
extent of non-labour income which is not subject to payroll tax.  It is
arguable that, for the typical person at risk of unemployment, this non-
labour income is extremely small.  For example, in 1987/8, only 7% of
unemployment entrants in Britain had savings of more than £3K, a sum
which would produce an annual interest income of around 10% of
unemployment benefit.14  So it may be that this tax switching effect is
simply too small to have any noticeable effect.
A more fundamental question is whether any of the taxes
(payroll, income or consumption) have an impact on labour costs in the
long-run, or whether they are all eventually shifted onto labour.  An
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obvious first approach to this issue is to see whether countries with
high taxes have higher labour costs than those with low taxes.  We
must obviously correct for productivity which suggests that we
correlate with tax rates across countries (W=labour costs,
W
P
/ Y
N
P=GDP deflator, Y=GDP, N=employment).  But this procedure is open
to objection.  Real labour costs normalised on productivity is precisely
equivalent to WN/PY, the share of labour.  In a Cobb-Douglas world,
for example, an increase in taxes might lead to a rise in W/P and a fall
in N, with the share of labour unchanged.  The proposed correlation
will then understate the true impact of taxes because of the fall in N
when labour costs rise.  This suggests that we normalise real labour
costs on Y/L where L is the labour force.
Taking average values over the period 1980-90 for thirteen OECD
countries15 we obtain
WL/PY=7.06+0.017t1+0.033t2-0.12t3
                                 (0.6)      (0.5)     (0.9)
(R2=0.13, N=13, t ratios in brackets)
where  t1  is  the  payroll tax rate,   t2  is  the  income tax rate,   t3  is the
consumption tax rate.  Basically there is no relationship between tax
rates and labour costs, indicating complete shifting onto labour.  A
similar result due to James Symons and Donald Robertson and based
on changes is reported in OECD (1990), Annex 6A.  Using changes
between 1974 and 1986 across 16 OECD countries,16 they obtain
? logW/P=-0.05+0.09? t1+0.33? t2+0.68? t3+0.97? log PROD
                                   (0.3)      (0.6)       (1.1)      (5.3)
(R2=0.80, N=16, t ratios in brackets; PROD is labour
productivity)
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Here again we see no significant effects of tax changes on real labour
costs although the numbers suggest that consumption taxes have the
biggest impact.
While these cross-section regressions are useful for looking at
long-run tax shifting, only time- series analysis can shed light on the
dynamics.  First we report some further results in the same Annex due
to Symons and Robertson, which are the average coefficients and t
ratios emerging from individual time-series regressions for 16 OECD
countries.  Thus we have
log (W/P)t =
const.+0.84log(W/P) t - 1+0.12log(K/L) t+0.46? (t1+t2+t 3)+0.07t1-
0.07t2+0.26t3
          (9.6)                  (1.4)               (2.3)                 (0.3)   (0.1)    (0.2)
(average t ratios in brackets)
These results suggest there is no systematic long-run impact of
taxes on labour costs but that the short-run effects are substantial.  A
one percentage point increase in the tax wedge (from whatever source)
leads to a short-run increase in labour costs of around ½% which takes
a long time to fade away.  So even after four years, labour costs are still
¼% higher.  Such effects will lead to significant and persistent
temporary increases in unemployment, particularly in the light of the
fact that tax wedges have risen by 10 to 20 percentage points in the last
30 years in most OECD countries.  In the long-run, however, these
unemployment effects will disappear.
These significant and long-lasting temporary tax effects imply
that, when looking at individual country data, it is very difficult to
discriminate between the short and long-run impacts of the individual
taxes.  There is simply not enough information.  Consequently, the
impression given by the collection of individual country time series
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studies of wage determination is that the estimated tax effects are all
over the place.  
It is not worth repeating the summaries in Layard et al. (1991),
p.210 and OECD (1994), p.247 but we may consider one recent
example, namely the work of Tyrväinen reported in OECD (1994).17
This work focuses on the long-run effects of taxes by using the
Johansen method to estimate long-run cointegrating relationships
between labour costs, taxes and other relevant variables.  The long-run
tax effects he obtains are given in Table 6.  The first point that stands
out is how big the tax effects are.  Whereas our previous evidence
indicated zero long-run tax effects, here we have a substantial long-run
impact of taxes.  Second, in all bar two of the countries, the tax effects
are uniform across all taxes.  Indeed, in no country is there any
advantage in switching from payroll taxes to consumption taxes.18  
We have investigated these matters further in the context of our
pooled regression equation of Table 3.  The payroll tax rate, as an
additional explanatory variable turns out to be insignificant (with a t-
statistic of 0.4) though the total tax burden as % of GDP comes in with
a small significant positive coefficient (though no effect on long-term
unemployment).  These results require further investigation.
On balance, we may perhaps conclude that taxes may have an
adverse effect on unemployment in the long run, but any such effect is
smallish, and that it relates to the burden of taxation in total and not to
payroll taxes in particular.19
7.  WORK-SHARING AND EARLY RETIREMENT
Two final much-canvassed solutions to unemployment are
reduced hours of work and early retirement.  Advocates of these
measures often seem to believe that there is some exogenous limit to
the amount of work to be done.  But history shows that, for a given
institutional structure, the amount of work tends to adjust in line with
the available supply of labour - leaving the equilibrium rate of
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unemployment unchanged.  We can begin with some theoretical
remarks, before supporting them with evidence.
Theoretical issues
We shall first examine the underlying theory in a long-term
context, using for illustration a simple efficiency wage model.
Efficiency per worker hour is e, which depends on hourly wages (Wi)
relative to the expected wage (W^ ) and on the unemployment rate:
ei=e(Wi /W^ , u).  Output is given by f (eHN) where H is hours per
worker, which can be varied exogenously.  Then the profits of the
representative firm are
The problem is recursive and the firm can first choose Wi to minimise
Wi /ei.  The optimum wage is then given by
Hence in general equilibrium (with Wi=W^ ) unemployment is determined
by
This holds irrespective of hours.
This result arises because the change in hours affects both those
making the wage comparison and the reference group with which the
comparison is being made.  In the long run both groups must be paid
the same.  However in the short run things could be different,
especially if people are comparing their wage with what they think they
“ought to” be paid - as in many models of real wage resistance.  The
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problem here is that people’s ideas of what they should be paid adjust
only gradually to the reality of what they are paid.  Thus
Suppose there is now a downwards productivity shock.  Sluggish
adjustment of the reference wage will for a time prevent actual wages
falling as much as is needed to preserve employment.  In this case
reduced hours can be an appropriate adjustment to temporary shocks.
Indeed in general there can be no objection to allowing hours to act as
shock-absorbers, as in Japan.  But this is quite different from saying
that lower hours will secure permanently higher employment.  They
will not, and they will also reduce the national output.
Similar arguments apply to the use of early retirement.  Since
labour market equilibrium requires a given unemployment rate,
reductions in labour supply will simply reduce equilibrium
employment.  Employment will of course take a while to adjust down,
and, until it does, there will be extra inflationary pressure in the
economy - which eventually leads to the necessary fall in real aggregate
demand (assuming nominal demand follows a steady path).  However
again a negative productivity shock together with real wage resistance
will lead to less unemployment if the labour force is temporarily
reduced.
Empirical analysis
It is fairly simple to check on these basic lines of reasoning.  We
ran the following wage equation for each of our usual 19 OECD
countries for the years 1952 to 1990:
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where w is log hourly earnings in manufacturing, p is log consumption
deflator, L is labour force, N employment, H is average weekly hours
in manufacturing and t is time.  We then computed the average value
of each coefficient (averaged across all countries) and its average t-
statistic.
If our reasoning has been correct we would expect 
(i) log H to have no significant effect, and
(ii) a3 to be insignificantly different from (-a4), indicating that it is the
unemployment rate which affects wage pressure and the size of
the labour force exerts no independent influence.
Both expectations were born out.  The equation looked as
follows, with average coefficients and average t-statistics:
w0 = 0 . 3 7 w0 - 1 + 0 . 6 3 p0 - 1 - 0 . 1 2 ( w - p ) - 1 - 2 . 1 0 l o g L + 1 . 8 2 l o g N -
0.16logH+0.008t+const.
    (1.8)                  (0.7)          (2.3)         (2.8)        (0.1)         (1.4)
Hours have no significant effect and a cut in the labour force raises
wage pressure in a way that can only be offset by an equivalent cut in
jobs.
We again examine these effects also in the context of our pooled
cross-section regression of Table 3.  Average hours worked, as
additional explanatory variable, had a small but statistically
insignificant (t=1.1) negative effect on unemployment.  A more rapid
growth of the labour force was also associated with significantly (t=2.4)
lower unemployment, but this result is not very plausible, and may
reflect largely the rapid growth of the labour force in the United States.
8.  CONCLUSIONS
We have found clear evidence that unemployment is strongly
affected by how unemployed people are treated and by how wages are
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determined.  There are also indications that problems of skill mismatch
have exacerbated European unemployment.  As regards employment
protection, there is no clear evidence of whether it decreases the
outflow rate from unemployment by more or less than it decreases the
inflow rate.  And there appears to be no long-term effect on
unemployment rates from employment taxes or from work-
sharing/early retirement.
Thus it is unhelpful to focus the discussion of unemployment on
the concept of flexibility.  Clearly lower benefits and less employment
protection are examples of more flexibility.  But active labour market
policy, coordinated wage bargaining, and skill training are not exactly
forms of flexibility.
It seems better to focus on the proper role of government in
affecting unemployment.  Clearly lower benefits of shorter duration
would reduce unemployment, but these policies should  be
accompanied by more (not less) active labour market policy.  Similarly
governments would be ill-advised to encourage the dismantling of
bargaining structures.  And they ought certainly to ensure that most
youngsters enter adult life with a basic level of competence.
Indeed if Europe’s social chapter is to contribute to lower
unemployment in Europe it needs to impose two further obligations on
governments: a) to prevent entry to long-term unemployment (by
replacing long-term benefits by active labour market policy), and b) to
prevent young people ceasing their education (full-time or part-time)
until they have acquired basic literacy, numeracy and vocational
competence.
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1. We are extremely grateful to Tim Hughes and Jan Eeckhout for
help with Sections 1 and 7, to Marco Manacorda and Barbara
Petrongolo for allowing us to draw on their work  in Section 4,
to W. Roëger for helpful comments, and to Philomena
McNicholas for typing the paper.
2. We also used the less conventional measure of “the change in
inflation relative to its initial level” - to allow for the extra
difficulty of reducing inflation when it is low.  This was only
marginally more significant then the conventional measure and
barely affected the other coefficients.  We also tried including the
trade deficit since inflation can always be reduced by a real
exchange rate appreciation; but it was insignificant and wrongly
signed. 
3. We are indebted to our discussant, W. Roëger, for emphasising
this point.
4. The other main influence was coordinated wage-bargaining.  We
reject the view that high employment was based on money
illusion and repeated devaluation.
5. Because of cyclical effects on the scale of ALMP it is difficult to
study the effect of ALMP on wage pressure (and thus
unemployment) from time series data, as has often been tried
(Calmfors and Nymoen, 1990;  Calmfors and  Forslund, 1991).
The best evidence must come from cross-sectional comparisons
such as our international comparisons in Table 3 or (when
available) more microeconomic comparisons of the effects of
institutional differences.
6. For a full discussion of the degree of coordination in 12 countries
see Soskice (1990).
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7. This draws heavily on the work of our colleagues M. Manacorda
and B. Petrongolo (1995).
8. Since lnWi'loga i%log
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9. There is also an important productivity argument.  It is well
known that a participatory environment is good for company
productivity (see Nickell, 1995a, Chapter 5) and that, as part of
this environment, some degree of job security is required.  If the
remainder of the economy is governed by very loose employment
protection laws, any employer who wishes to introduce some
degree of job security for the above reasons may be so beset by
adverse selection problems that she is unable to operate a
participatory system.  This mechanism could easily operate to the
detriment of national productivity growth.
10. When analysing labour demand dynamics on the basis of
aggregate data, it is necessary to face up to some criticisms of this
activity set out by Kramaz (1991), Caballero (1992) and
Hamermesh (1992).  Thus Hamermesh argues that “one cannot
use aggregate dynamics to examine or compare the structures or
sizes of adjustment costs” (p.8).  Since we intend to do just this,
we must examine the arguments closely.
Hamermesh looks at three types of adjustment cost structures,
namely fixed costs, linear costs and asymmetric quadratic costs.
In each case he concludes that, in aggregate, the adjustment speed
is related both to micro adjustments costs and to the cross-section
variance of sectoral shocks.  When looking across countries there
is, therefore, the danger that any correlation between adjustment
speeds and adjustment costs is corrupted by our inability to
control for the variance of sectoral shocks.  It is more or less
impossible to obtain comparable measures of the variance of
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sectoral shocks because of the difficulty of obtaining consistent
sectoral breakdowns across a large number of countries.
However, this corruption will only be serious if the cross-section
variance of shocks is strongly correlated with adjustment costs
across countries.  While we have no evidence on this, there seem
to be no strong a priori arguments in favour of such a correlation,
in which case the omission of this variable is not a problem.
Finally, it is worth remarking that estimated labour market
dynamics look very similar at the aggregate and at the firm level.
For example, the dynamics of a UK aggregate annual employment
equation have the form nt =1.06nt-1-0.36nt-2+ etc., whereas a
similar annual equation based on UK company data has dynamics
nt=0.83nt-1-0.14nt-2+etc.,
(see Layard et al. 1991, Chapter 9, Table 15, and Nickell and
Wadhwani, 1991, Table III).  Both exhibit a considerable degree
of persistence, with shocks dying away at a very similar rate.
11. The results in OECD (1993), Table 3.5 indicate a strong positive
relationship between wages and long-term unemployment at
given unemployment rates.  Since long-term unemployment is
negatively related to unemployment changes in the short-run, this
asserts a positive relationship between long-term unemployment
and hysteresis effects (negative effects of unemployment changes
on wages).
12. This is the non-labour income argument.  Hoon and Phelps
(1995) also provide a real interest rate argument which we do not
consider here.
13. The effect will be enhanced if B is exogenous, rather than B/W(1-
t1).  Typically, however, most countries (although not Britain) set
the replacement ratio rather than the level of benefit.
14. See Layard et al. (1991), Table A6.
15. These are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
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Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK, US.
16. These are those recorded in endnote 15 plus Austria, Finland,
Ireland, Norway and Switzerland minus Denmark and Spain.
17. See OECD (1994), p.246.
18. So long as the tax base for these is the same.  If, of course, it
happens that the consumption tax base is larger, then a lower
consumption tax rate would raise the same revenue and have a
lesser impact on labour costs.
19. There is a separate question about the effect of changing the
progressivity of the employment tax.  If skill formation responds
very little to relative wages there is a strong case for a fiscally
neutral shift towards greater progressivity, raising the demand for
unskilled labour and reducing it for skilled (Layard, Nickell and
Jackman, Sections 6.5 and 10.3).
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TABLE 1
Unemployment Rates, Total, Long-Term and Short-Term (%)
1983-88 1989-94
Total Long-Term Short-
Term
Total Long-Term Short-
Term
Belgium 11.3 8.0 3.3 8.1 5.1 2.9
Denmark 9.0 3.0 6.0 10.8 3.0 7.9
France 9.8 4.4 5.4 10.4 3.9 6.5
Germany 6.8 3.1 3.7 5.4 2.2 3.2
Ireland 16.1 9.2 6.9 14.8 9.4 5.4
Italy 6.9 3.8 3.1 8.2 5.3 2.9
Netherlands 10.5 5.5 5.0 7.0 3.5 3.5
Portugal 7.6 4.2 3.5 5.0 2.0 3.0
Spain 19.6 11.3 8.4 18.9 9.7 9.1
UK 10.9 5.1 5.8 8.9 3.4 5.5
Australia 8.4 2.4 5.9 9.0 2.7 6.2
N.Zealand 4.9 0.6 4.3 8.9 2.3 6.6
Canada 9.9 0.9 9.0 9.8 0.9 8.9
USA 7.1 0.7 6.4 6.2 0.6 5.6
Japan 2.7 0.4 2.2 2.3 0.4 1.9
Austria 3.6 n.k. n.k. 3.7 n.k. n.k.
Finland 5.1 1.0 4.0 10.5 1.7 8.9
Norway 2.7 0.2 2.5 5.5 1.2 4.3
Sweden 2.6 0.3 2.3 4.4 0.4 4.0
Switzerland 0.8 0.1 0.7 2.3 0.5 1.8 
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Sources and Notes to Table 1
Source: Total:  OECD Standardised rates except for Italy (which is
the US BLS measure)
Long-Term:  Total times share of long-term in total (as in
OECD Employment Outlook, appendix).
Note: Long-term means over 1 year.
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TABLE 2
Explanatory Variables
When variable changes between the two sub-periods, the first number is for 1983-88 and the
second for 1989-94.
Replacement
Rate
Benefit
Duration
ALMP Union
Coverage
Belgium 60 4 10.0 14.6 3
Denmark 90 2.5 10.6 10.3 3
France 57 3.75 3 7.2 8.8 3
Germany 63 4 12.9 25.7 3
Ireland 50 37 4 9.2 9.1 3
Italy 2 20 0.5 10.1 10.3 3
Netherlands 70 4 2 4.0  6.9 3
Portugal 60 65 0.5 0.8 5.9 18.8 3
Spain 80 70 3.5 3.2 4.7 3
UK 36 38 4 7.8 6.4 3 2
Australia 39 36 4 4.1 3.2 3
New Zealand 38 30 4 15.4 6.8 2
Canada 60 59 0.5  1 6.3 5.9 2
USA 50 0.5 3.9 3.0 1
Japan 60 0.5 5.4 4.3 2
Austria 60 50 4 8.7 8.3 3
Finland 75 63 4 2 18.4 16.4 3
Norway 65 1.5 9.5 14.7 3
Sweden 80 1.2 59.5 59.3 3
Switzerland 70 1 23.0 8.2 2
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Table 2 continued
Union
Coordination
Employer
Coordination
Employment
Protection
Change in
Inflation
Belgium 2 2 17 -0.76 -0.52
Denmark 3 3 5 -0.86 -0.46
France 2 2 14 -1.38 -0.30
Germany 2 3 15 -0.34 -0.04
Ireland 1 1 12 -1.52 -0.54
Italy 2 1 2 20 -1.68 -0.52
Netherlands 2 2 9 -0.14 0.14
Portugal 2 2 18 -2.74 -1.28
Spain 2 1 19 -1.24 -0.60
UK 1 1 7 0.16 -1.02
Australia 2 1 4 0.02 -1.24
New Zealand 2 1 1 2 0.36 -1.22
Canada 1 1 3 -0.08 -0.84
USA 1 1 1 -0.04  -0.48
Japan 2 2 8 -0.20 -0.36
Austria 3 3 16 -0.46 0.06
Finland 3 2 3 10 -0.26 -0.72
Norway 3 3 11 -0.34 -1.12
Sweden 3 3 13 -0.75 -1.02
Switzerland 1 3 6 -0.12 -0.50
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Sources to Table 2
Replacement rate and benefit duration: Mainly US Department of
Health and Social Services, Social Security Programmes throughout the
World, 1985 and 1993.  See LNJ Annex 1.3
ALMP: OECD Employment Outlook, 1988 and 1995.  For the first
sub-period the data relate to 1987 and for the second to 1991.  We
include all active spending, except on the disabled.
Union coverage - union coordination and employer coordination:
See LNJ Annex 1.4 and OECD Employment Outlook 1994 pp.175-
185.
Employment protection: OECD Jobs Study (1994) Part II Table 6.7
Col.5 p.74.  Country ranking with 20 as the most strictly regulated.
Inflation: OECD Economic Outlook
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TABLE 3
Regressions to Explain log Unemployment Rate (%)
(20 OECD Countries, 1983-8 and 1989-94)
Total
unemployment 
(1)
Long-term
unemployment
(2)
Short-term
unemployment
(3)
Replacement Rate (%) 0.011 (1.6) 0.004 (0.5) 0.009 (1.2)
Benefit Duration (yrs) 0.09 (1.3) 0.16 (1.9) 0.04 (0.6)
ALMP (%) -0.008 (0.7) -0.03 (2.0) -0.0008 (0.07)
Union Coverage (1-3) 0.66 (2.7) 0.56 (1.7) 0.54 (2.2)
Coordination (1-3) -0.68 (3.2) -0.29 (0.9) -0.57 (2.4)
Employment Protection (1-20) -0.005 (0.2) 0.09 (2.7) -0.04 (1.6)
Change in Inflation
(% points p.a.)
-0.17 (1.7) -0.13 (1.1) -0.15 (1.6)
Constant
Dummy for 89-94
-3.96
0.16
(7.3)
(1.9)
-3.28
0.1
(2.9)
(0.9)
-3.8
0.16
(7.0)
(2.1)
Log (Short-Term Unemployment) - 0.94 (4.0) -
R2 0.59 0.81 0.41
s.e. 0.51 0.59 0.52
N 40 38 38
Dependent Variables:
(1) Total unemployed as % of labour force.
(2) Long-term unemployed (over 1 year) as % of labour force.
(3) Short-term unemployed (under 1 year) as % of labour force.
t-statistics in brackets.  These are based on the method of ‘random effects’.
Notes: (i) ALMP is measured by current active labour market spending as % of GDP
divided by current unemployment.  To handle problems of endogeneity and
measurement error this is instrumented by active labour market spending
in 1987 as % of GDP divided by average unemployment rate 1977-9.
(ii) The coefficients measure the proportional effect on unemployment of a unit change in an
independent variable, where the unit is measured as in Table 2.
